Modelling thirty five years of coffee prices in Brazil, Guatemala and India by Mohan, Sushil & Russell, Bill
                                                              
University of Dundee
Modelling thirty five years of coffee prices in Brazil, Guatemala and India
Mohan, Sushil; Russell, William
Publication date:
2008
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Mohan, S., & Russell, B. (2008). Modelling thirty five years of coffee prices in Brazil, Guatemala and India.
(Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 221). University of Dundee.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Mar. 2016
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
Economic Studies, 
University of Dundee, 
Dundee. 
DD1 4HN 
 
 
Dundee Discussion Papers 
in Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODELLING THIRTY FIVE YEARS OF 
COFFEE PRICES 
IN BRAZIL, GUATEMALA AND INDIA 
 
 
 
 
 
Sushil Mohan 
& 
Bill Russell 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Working Paper 
 No. 221 
December 2008 
ISSN:1473-236X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODELLING THIRTY FIVE YEARS OF COFFEE PRICES  
IN BRAZIL, GUATEMALA AND INDIA* 
 
 Sushil Mohan  Bill Russell# 
11 December 2008 
 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past thirty five years coffee markets have been subject to market controls and 
regulations culminating in the liberalisation of coffee markets in the early 1990s.  This paper 
models the relationship between the producers’ and world prices of coffee in Brazil, 
Guatemala and India allowing for the effects of changes in market structures.  We find that 
liberalisation has benefited producers substantially in terms of higher real coffee prices and a 
higher share of the world price of coffee. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 1990s unilateral and multilateral interventions in coffee markets were common.1 
The broad objective of the interventions was macroeconomic stabilisation for the general 
welfare of the population and price stabilisation for the specific welfare of coffee producers.2 
The interventions took the form of export supply management through regulations or buffer 
stock schemes and in many cases the domestic market was also regulated through the 
administration of the prices received by producers. In terms of producer welfare, the 
interventions are generally regarded as unsuccessful.3  The initiation of economic reforms in 
developing countries in the late 1980s resulted in most countries liberalising their coffee 
sector by replacing state-controlled marketing systems with markets run by private agents. 
The pace and scope of liberalisation varied across countries but has resulted in a more 
competitive international coffee market that is now mostly subject to market forces. 
The liberalisation of coffee markets is expected to bring clear benefits to producers from the 
introduction of more efficient markets but it also exposes the intermediaries and producers in 
developing countries to the vagaries of the market. The commonly held view is that 
liberalisation has increased the producer’s share of the terminal price of coffee because of the 
reduction in intermediation costs arising from the greater degree of vertical integration in 
coffee markets (Mohan, 2007).4 
Changes in coffee policies at both the domestic and international levels and the eventual 
liberalisation of coffee markets raise a number of issues when modelling coffee prices.  For 
                                                 
1 Unless specified otherwise, ‘coffee’ means green (raw or un-roasted) beans and coffee prices imply prices 
of green beans. 
2  Coffee producers include growers and/or semi-processors, who sell their coffee as cherries, parchment or 
green beans. If producers sell their coffee as cherry or parchment, the prices are converted to green beans 
by using a ‘green bean equivalent’. 
3  For example, see Raffaeli (1995), McIntire and Varangis (1999), Jerome and Ogunkola (2000), Varangis et 
al. (2002), Winter-Nelson and Temu (2002), Krivonos (2004) and Boudreaux (2007). 
4 The terminal price of coffee is the spot price of coffee as traded in international markets and the producer 
price of coffee is the cash price received by producers. 
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example, consider Graph 1 of terminal and producer prices for Brazilian, Guatemalan and 
Indian Arabica coffee.5  There are three striking features common to these graphs.  First, the 
price of coffee received by producers at the beginning of the Twenty First Century is much 
the same as it was in the 1970s suggesting a large fall in real terms.  This fall in the real price 
of coffee is demonstrated in Table 1.6 
Second, the gap between the terminal and producer prices of coffee varies considerably over 
time in all three countries.  This gap can be thought of as an indirect measure of the costs of 
transferring coffee from the producer to the terminal markets.  Between January 1973 and 
December 1989 the average transfer costs were around 85 (141 per cent of the average 
producer price), 45 (54 per cent), and 58 (72 per cent) US cents per pound of coffee for 
Brazil, Guatemala and India respectively.  Following the liberalisation of coffee markets 
there has been a decline in transfer costs.  Since January 1990 average transfer costs were 
around 18 (28 per cent), 32 (46 per cent) and 30 (42 per cent) US cents per pound of coffee 
for the three countries respectively.  Such large reductions in transfer costs are unlikely to be 
explained by changes in the freight, handling and related costs alone.  It is more likely the 
reductions are due to changes in the economic rents received by intermediaries and 
governments in the transfer process. 
The third feature follows from the second.  Large changes in transfer costs associated with 
changing government policies, regulations and market structure causes shifts in the 
producers’ share of the terminal price of coffee.  The share is the ratio of the producer to the 
terminal price of coffee and is also referred to in the paper as the coffee price ratio.  These 
shifts are at times quite sudden and persistent as demonstrated in Graph 2 of the coffee price 
ratio for the three countries. 
If the terminal and producer prices of coffee are closely related then any modelling of the two 
prices must take into account the shifts in the coffee price ratio.  If the shifts are not 
                                                 
5  Details of the data are provided in Appendix 1. 
6  The real price of coffee in Table 1 is measured in terms of the United Nations (UN) index of unit values of 
exports.  Similar results are obtained if the real price of coffee is measured in terms of the United States 
consumer price index (CPI). 
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accounted for then the model will result in biased and poor estimates that may lead to 
incorrect inferences.  This paper, therefore, models the relationship between the terminal and 
producer prices of coffee in Brazil, Guatemala and India allowing for the shifts in the coffee 
price ratio.  These three countries are chosen due to their important positions in the world 
coffee market and the variation in the policies and market structures over time in each 
country and across countries.  We demonstrate that the modelling approach we adopt is 
successful in dealing with this variation. 
The next section sets out the standard empirical modelling approach to coffee prices and 
explains the source of the biases in the standard empirical literature.  Section 3 reports the 
results of the estimated models which are surprisingly similar for the three countries given 
their different experiences. 
We estimate that the equilibrium producer’s share of the terminal price of coffee has 
increased in all three countries since coffee market liberalisation to around 0.85 in Brazil and 
India and 0.8 in Guatemala.  If liberal markets lead to these high producer shares then we can 
calculate the loss to producers from coffee market regulations and interventions over the 
years.  In section 4 we show the loss is substantial.  For example the cumulative loss to 
producers between 1973 and 1989 is 30.2, 1.0 and 1.8 billion US$ for Brazil, Guatemala and 
India respectively.  This can be compared with the cumulative total of payments to producers 
over the same period of 31.7, 6.1 and 3.8 billion US$.  Also shown in Section 4 is that these 
losses are now almost non-existent following the liberalisation of coffee markets. 
2. MODELLING COFFEE PRICES 
The standard approach to modelling coffee prices can be motivated with reference to the 
Enke (1951), Samuelson (1952), Takayama and Judge (1971) spatial models of prices and the 
‘law of one price’.7  These models argue that when two markets attain equilibrium prices the 
prices differ only by the costs of transferring the goods between the markets. The transfer 
                                                 
7  See also Ardeni (1989), Badiane and Shivley (1998), Baffes (1991), McNew (1996), Abdulai (2000), and 
Fackler and Goodwin (2002) and Conforti and Rapsomanikas (2005).  The coffee model can be thought of 
as ‘spatial’ in terms of the geographic locations of producer and terminal coffee markets. 
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costs include the shipping and storage costs associated with moving produce between markets 
along with the economic rents of intermediate agents in the supply chain. In this model, 
demand and supply shocks are fully transmitted between the two markets in equilibrium. 
The equilibrium in coffee prices between the terminal and producer markets can be 
represented in these models as: 
 etTtP UPP *,, =  (1) 
where tPP ,  and tTP ,  are the producer and terminal prices measured as price per unit of coffee 
respectively, eU  is the constant ratio that coffee prices in the two markets attain in 
equilibrium and the ‘t’ subscript indicates the time period of the data.  Note that even though 
the producer price of coffee is the subject of the equilibrium relationship in equation (1) it 
does not imply causation between the two prices which is conceptually bi-directional. 
With 1<eU  in equation (1) we can identify transfer costs, tTC , associated with the 
movement of coffee between the two markets such that tPtTt PPTC ,, −=  which are also 
measured in price per unit of coffee. In the short run the equilibrium relationship (1) need not 
apply due to the incomplete transfer of information between markets and other rigidities.  
However, in the long run we expect this equilibrium relationship to hold if information is 
shared efficiently between markets and all agents make normal profits.8 
An assumption of this model that is not often highlighted in the literature is that the transfer 
costs in equilibrium are a fixed ratio of both the terminal and producer prices of coffee.  For 
example, transfer costs as a ratio to, or share of, the terminal price of coffee in equilibrium is: 
 e
tT
tPtT
tT
t U
P
PP
P
TC −=−= 1
,
,,
,
 (2) 
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Importantly, this implies that if the equilibrium in coffee prices is adequately described by 
this model then the statistical process of the transfer costs is the same as that of the two coffee 
prices in equilibrium.  If this was not the case then when equilibrium coffee prices are 
attained in the two markets, transfer costs will not have returned to its equilibrium ratio in 
terms of the respective coffee prices.  This implication is important for our modelling of 
coffee prices below. 
In the coffee price literature, the equilibrium model of coffee prices has a straightforward 
time series interpretation in terms of cointegration analysis.9  We can write (1) as: 
 etTtP upp += ,,  (3) 
where lower case variables are the natural logarithms of the equivalent upper case variables.  
If tPp ,  and tTp ,  are integrated processes and we can find a linear combination of the two 
prices such that; 
 ttTtP pp ωβ =− ,,  (4) 
where tω  is a stationary process with a constant mean then tPp ,  and tTp ,  are cointegrated in 
the sense of Engle and Granger (1987) and there exists a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between the two coffee price variables.10  This relationship is interpreted as the equilibrium 
relationship in equation (3) if 1=β  so that the model displays long-run homogeneity.  This 
means that a 1 percent increase in one coffee price leads to a 1 per cent increase in the other 
price in the long run so that transfer costs as a proportion of either the terminal or the 
producer price are unchanged.  This also implies that transfer costs have increased by 1 per 
                                                                                                                                                        
8  In the short run the coffee price ratio tU  may be greater than one implying that intermediaries make losses 
in the transfer of coffee between the two markets.  However, this situation cannot continue in equilibrium 
as losses would lead agents to exit the market until intermediaries make ‘normal’ profits and 1<eU . 
9  For example see, Rapsomanikas et al. (2004), Fortenbery and Zapta (2004), Krivonos (2004) and Alizadeh 
and Nomikos (2005),. 
10  See also Johansen (1988, 1991, 1995). 
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cent in the long run.  With trending price and cost variables β  needs to equal 1 so that a 
persistent change in the level of coffee prices does not lead to a persistent change in the gap 
between the two prices in equation (3). In other words, 1=β  means that a change in the level 
of prices leaves the coffee price ratio unchanged in the long run and transfer costs have 
increased in line with prices. 
The long-run relationship of equation (3) is nested within a vector autoregressive-error 
correction model (VAR-ECM): 
 t
k
i
ititt xxx εδ +ΔΠ+Π+=Δ ∑
=
−−
1
1  (5) 
where 
tT
P
t p
p
x ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= , Π  is the long-run matrix containing the cointegrating vectors, iΠ  is a 
matrix of short-run coefficients and Δ  represents the change in the variable such that 
1−−=Δ ttt xxx .  The vector of unrestricted constants is given by δ  which can be written so 
as to incorporate eu  from equation (3).  Estimating the VAR-ECM allows us to (i) formally 
test for the presence and the number of cointegrating vectors; (ii) test whether long-run 
homogeneity is a valid restriction; (iii) estimate the speed of adjustment back to the long-run 
relationship; and (iv) identify whether producer prices, terminal prices, or both adjust when 
prices are away from the long-run cointegrating relationship. 
Two important assumptions concerning the equilibrium relationship (3) and the cointegration 
analysis are that the coffee price ratio, tu , converges on a constant value, 
eu , in equilibrium 
and that tu  is a stationary process with a constant mean equal to 
eu .  Looking closely at 
Graph 2 we can see discrete shifts in the mean of the coffee price ratio.  These visual shifts in 
the ratio can be tested formally by applying the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, 2003b) 
technique for identifying multiple structural breaks in the coffee price ratio, tu .
11  Defining a 
‘coffee regime’ as a period with a constant mean coffee price ratio, the Bai-Perron technique 
                                                 
11  See Appendix 2 for details of the Bai-Perron estimates of the structural breaks in the coffee price ratio. 
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identifies 11, 9, and 12 coffee regimes for Brazil, Guatemala and India.  These regimes are 
shown in Graph 2 as horizontal thin lines. 
It appears, therefore, that the two important assumptions are not valid.  This suggests there is 
a time dimension to the mean ratio of coffee prices and therefore the long-run coffee price 
ratio should be represented as etu  and equation (4) should be written: 
 t
e
ttTtP upp ωββ =−− 2,1,  (6) 
and 
t
e
P
T
t
u
p
p
x
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=  in the VAR-ECM. 
If estimation of the model proceeds assuming that the ratio of coffee prices is time invariant 
as implicitly (or explicitly) assumed in the standard literature then the estimates of the long-
run coefficients, β , and the adjustment coefficients in equation (5) will be poor and biased if 
the coffee price ratio, tu , is non-stationary.  The direction of this bias depends on whether the 
coffee price ratio is increasing or decreasing over the period.  Consequently, how we model 
the coffee price ratio may affect our estimates in important ways. 
There are three obvious ways to model the changes in the mean of the coffee price ratio.  The 
first is to approximate the changing mean of etu  with a linear trend.  In this case we introduce 
a trend, T, in the cointegrating space and the cointegrating relationship is: 
  tttTtP Tpp ωββ =−− 2,1,  (7) 
and 
t
P
T
t
T
p
p
x
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=  in equation (5).  The second way is to introduce a series of shift dummies, 
iD , in the cointegration space to capture the discrete changes in 
e
tu  associated with each 
coffee regime as shown in Graph 2.  This provides: 
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 ti
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⎟⎟
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⎛
= 1  in equation (5) where k is the number of estimated ‘coffee regimes’.  The 
third option is combine equations (7) and (8) and include both a trend and the shift dummies 
in the cointegration space. 
3. ESTIMATING AN ERROR CORRECTION MODEL OF COFFEE PRICES 
In this section we report estimates of four models for each of the three coffee producing 
countries.  The first model is the standard model from the literature as in equation (5).  The 
remaining models include the more complicated proxies for the long-run coffee price ratio, 
e
tu , outlined above.  In model two the proxy is a linear trend as in equation (7).  Model three 
includes a trend and a series of shift dummies that represent the coffee regimes identified 
previously by the Bai-Perron technique.  Finally, in model four the proxy is just a series of 
shift dummies as in equation (8). 
3.1 The Data 
The models are estimated using the average monthly ICO Indicator Price for Arabica coffee 
as a measure of terminal prices and the average monthly producer price for Arabica coffee in 
Brazil, Guatemala and India for the period January 1973 to October 2007.12 In analysing the 
data we should keep in mind the factors that could influence the evolution of coffee prices. 
The period 1973 to 1989 coincides with the operation of the International Coffee Agreement 
for regulating the market through export quotas.13  Under the Agreement, export-quotas were 
allotted to exporting countries and they were changed according to changes in world coffee 
                                                 
12  Further details concerning the data are provided in Appendix 1. 
13  Its stated aim was to achieve price stabilisation, increase revenue from coffee and adjust production in line 
with demand. 
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prices.  However, the Agreement did not always operate as there was failure to reach any 
agreement among participating countries in 1968, 1972, 1973 and between 1977 and 1980 
(Raffaeli, 2005).  The Agreement was finally suspended in 1989. The period from 1990 is 
marked by the liberalisation of the coffee trade at the international level with the abolition of 
all systems for regulating the coffee market and at the national level through the progressive 
dismantling of coffee marketing board monopolies in many coffee producing countries. 
Brazil, Guatemala and India regulated their coffee markets, by way of controls on the 
production, sale and distribution of coffee, in compliance with the International Coffee 
Agreement. In addition to this, Brazil and India followed a system in which producers’ coffee 
was pooled and auctioned for both the domestic and export markets. The producers were paid 
a guaranteed price which was fixed from time to time on the basis of auction prices. Although 
auction prices reflected market conditions, the producer prices were at times changed after a 
lag in time and involved bureaucratic delays as well as other considerations including 
government interventions. This system ended in Brazil in 1989 and since 1990 coffee 
marketing has been totally liberalised and run by the private sector. However, in India the 
system was phased out gradually from 1990 onwards and it was only by 1995 that coffee 
marketing was totally liberalised (ITF, 2005). 
3.2 The Statistical Process of Coffee Prices 
How we interpret the estimated models depends in part on what we believe is the statistical 
process of coffee prices.  The standard way to proceed in the literature is to assume that both 
coffee price series tTp ,  and tPp ,  are integrated of order 1 (I(1)).
14  In this case a necessary 
condition for the model to be valid is that we accept the hypothesis of one cointegrating 
vector.15  This implies there is a long-run relationship between the two coffee prices.  Tests of 
the number of cointegrating vectors for each model reported in Table 2 do not provide 
compelling evidence of one cointegrating vector for all of the countries in any of the four 
                                                 
14  See footnote 9. 
15  This is not a sufficient condition as we also need to accept the homogeneity restriction, 1=β , plus other 
tests of the model’s overall performance. 
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models.  Furthermore, as we improve the proxy for the ratio of coffee prices, tμ , in the 
estimated models the evidence of one cointegrating vector becomes even less compelling. 
The problem is that over the last thirty five years coffee prices do not appear to be I(1).  This 
can be seen in Graph 1 and is supported by the univariate unit root tests reported in Table 3 
where we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the data of all the coffee price series 
for all three countries.  Furthermore, after including the shift dummies corresponding to the 
coffee regimes we find even ‘stronger’ evidence that the producer price and the terminal price 
of coffee are stationary processes. 
Fortunately this does not affect the interpretation of our results in a meaningful way.  If we 
find 1=β  so that the homogeneity restriction is valid and the error correction mechanism is 
significant then in the long run the coffee price ratio, tu , converges on some constant value 
irrespective of whether coffee prices are integrated or stationary.  If coffee prices are 
integrated of order 1 with one cointegrating vector and 1=β  then we have identified a long-
run cointegrating relationship in the Engle and Granger (1987) sense.  In this case the coffee 
price ratio converges on a unique value in the long run.  Alternatively, if both coffee prices 
are stationary with constant means (after allowing for a trend and/or shifts in mean) then the 
significant error correction term again returns the coffee price ratio to some unique value in 
the long run. 
Therefore, any long-run relationship between the two coffee prices estimated in the VAR-
ECM can be interpreted in terms of the underlying theoretical model outlined in equation (1).  
Specifically, the estimated long-run relationship identifies the value to which the coffee price 
ratio, tu , converges on in the long run.
16 
                                                 
16  This suggests that too much emphasis may be placed on cointegration in the coffee price literature.  
Furthermore, the common finding in the literature that coffee prices follow integrated processes may 
simply be due to the un-modelled structural breaks in the coffee price series. 
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3.3 VAR-ECM Estimates of Coffee Price Models 
While there is some variation in the estimates of the three countries there is a strong pattern 
in the results.  Beginning with model 1 reported in Table 4 we see that if we were not aware 
of the breaks in the coffee price series we might conclude that a VAR-ECM is a relatively 
poor representation of the dynamics of coffee prices.  We can only accept the long-run 
homogeneity restriction that 1=β  for Guatemala and the adjustment coefficients are 
relatively small implying very slow convergence to the long-run coffee price ratio. 
Table 5 reports estimates of model 2 that includes a linear trend.  The restriction that the trend 
is significant is accepted for Guatemala and India but rejected for Brazil.  The long-run 
homogeneity restriction that 1=β  is now only accepted for Brazil and the adjustment 
coefficients remain low implying again that convergence to the long-run relationship is very 
slow. 
Including a trend and shift dummies in model 3, Table 6 shows that we now accept at the 5 
per cent level for all three countries the long-run restriction that 1=β  but the trend is 
insignificant.  It appears that the trend is dominated by the shift dummies as a proxy for the 
shifts in the long-run coffee price ratio.  Finally, in model four of equation (8) reported in 
Table 7 we exclude the insignificant trend leaving only the shift dummies.  We now find the 
shift dummies are highly significant, we can continue to accept 1=β  for all three countries 
and the error correction mechanisms are strongly significant with large adjustment 
coefficients. 
Model four is preferred for three reasons.  First, it conforms to the theoretical spatial models 
of prices and our intuitive understanding of how terminal and producer prices are related.  
Second, it accounts for the expected structural breaks in the coffee price data in a way that is 
consistent with how we might expect policy changes to affect the coffee price ratio.  And 
third, coffee prices converge on their long-run values very quickly as expected in commodity 
markets. 
The preferred model finds that the two coffee prices move very closely together and that 
there is a very powerful error correction mechanism operating in all three countries.  We also 
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accept the restriction of linear homogeneity suggesting that changes in one coffee price are 
fully reflected in changes in the other coffee price in the long run once we account for the 
one-off impact of changes in policy on coffee prices and their ratio.  Adjustment to the long-
run coffee price ratio is also believably fast.  Following a shock to the coffee price ratio, half 
of the adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium occurs in around 2 ½ months for Brazil 
and 1 month for Guatemala and India.17  Finally, the long-run coffee price ratios estimated in 
model 4 are the same as the mean ratios already shown in Graph 2 as horizontal thin lines. 
4. COST TO PRODUCERS OF COFFEE MARKET REGULATION 
The long-run equilibrium coffee price ratio (i.e. the producers’ share of the terminal price of 
coffee) is particularly useful for examining the impact of government policies and changing 
market structures on the coffee market as it abstracts from short-run variations and shocks to 
the ratio. For example, since the liberalisation of coffee markets the long-run producers share 
has increased to around 0.85 for Brazil and India and 0.79 for Guatemala in the most recent 
period.18  Assuming these ratios reflect the ‘efficient’ market outcome then we can estimate 
the loss to producers by examining the extent to which their share deviates from the efficient 
outcome. 
The dashed and the black lines in Graph 3 show the annual value of coffee production 
measured at terminal and producer prices respectively for each of the three countries. The 
grey line is what coffee producers would have received according to the efficient outcome 
throughout the period.19  The gap between the grey and black lines is the loss to producers 
                                                 
17  The adjustment speeds are calculated from simulations based on the estimates in Table 7. 
18  The slightly lower figure for Guatemala may reflect idiosyncratic or fundamental market reasons. 
19  Calculated as: etTt UPQ 2007, ••  where tQ  is the production of coffee and eU 2007  is the long-run coffee 
price ratio in 2007 for each country.  This calculation assumes that production and the terminal price of 
coffee are independent of the efficient coffee price ratio. 
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relative to the efficient outcome which is shown as the solid thin line in Graph 4.20  Graph 4 
also shows this loss in real terms measured in 2007 prices. 
We observe that producers suffered losses in all three countries during the 1970s and early 
1980s.  In 2007 prices, the real losses to producers peak at around US$7 billion in the early 
1980s for Brazil and around US$0.45 billion for Guatemala and India in the mid 1970s.  The 
losses trail off to negligible levels in the most recent periods following liberalisation in all 
three countries indicating that market interventions over the years have not been in the overall 
interest of producers. 
Note that these measures of loss are in respect to the producers alone and not necessarily to 
the country as a whole.  The loss, or a part of the loss, may simply represent a transfer from 
the producer to either the government or intermediaries in the transfer process. 
5. ARE PRODUCERS BETTER OFF? 
Are producers better off following the liberalisation of coffee markets?  To answer this 
question we consider three interrelated issues since the liberalisation of the coffee markets.  
First, what has happened to the producer price of coffee?  Second, what has happened to the 
quantity of coffee produced? And finally, what has happened to the share of the terminal 
price of coffee that goes to the producer? 
The conventional view is that coffee market interventions increased the producer price of 
coffee. This suggests that the producer price of coffee should have fared better during the 
period of interventions than after liberalisation.  This is not supported by Table 1.  In the 
seventeen years prior to liberalisation, producer price inflation is only half that of the ‘world’ 
inflation rate of 6.6 per cent as measured by the UN index of unit values of exports or the 
United States CPI.  Producer prices increased by 3.3, 1.0 and 2.3 per cent per annum in 
Brazil, Guatemala and India but in real terms they fell by 42, 60 and 50 per cent respectively.  
In contrast, during the period 1990 to 2007 when coffee markets witnessed the phase of 
liberalisation, producer prices increased by 3.6, 3.5, and 2.9 per cent per annum in Brazil, 
                                                 
20  The loss to producers is calculated as: [ ]tetTt UUPQ −•• 2007, . 
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Guatemala and India compared with ‘world’ inflation of less than 1 per cent per annum as 
measured by the UN index of unit values of exports.  This means that the producer price of 
coffee increased by around 60, 55 and 40 per cent in real terms.21 
Coffee prices therefore did not match the growth in ‘world’ prices during the years of coffee 
market interventions up to 1990 but increased by more than ‘world’ prices after the 
liberalisation of coffee markets.  This is inconsistent with the conventional view. The 
magnitude of the turn around in the behaviour of real coffee prices since liberalisation is 
substantial.  The producer price of coffee in 2007 is 164, 263, and 172 per cent higher in 
Brazil, Guatemala and India than the price that would have existed if the trend decline in real 
prices in the seventeen years up to 1990 had continued in the seventeen years after 1990.22 
The data also shows there has been a large increase in coffee production following 
liberalisation in all three countries.  Average coffee production in the seventeen years after 
1990 is 1.3, 1.3 and 1.8 times the coffee production in the seventeen years prior to 1990 in 
Brazil, Guatemala and India respectively (ICO, 2007). There may be many reasons for this 
increase in production. However, a part of the increase may be attributed to the removal of 
restrictions imposed on the production of coffee prior to liberalisation and to the added 
incentive after liberalisation for producers to supply better quality coffee, which in turn has 
helped the growth in the consumption of coffee worldwide. In any case, as far as producers 
are concerned they have gained both in terms of prices and production following 
liberalisation. Finally, the empirical analysis above demonstrates that the producers’ long-run 
share of the terminal price of coffee has increased systematically since liberalisation of coffee 
                                                 
21  In the period 1990 to 2007 United States CPI deviates from the UN index of unit values of exports (see 
Table 1).  However, if we use United States CPI as a measure of world inflation we find that producer 
prices still increase in real terms by around 15, 13 and 2 per cent respectively compared with the large falls 
in real coffee prices prior to coffee market liberalisation. 
22  The increase in real coffee prices is calculated as:  [ ] 11 17 −−+ BeforeAfter rprp  where rp  is the 
average annualised change in the real producer price of coffee both after and before 1990 (see Table 1).  As 
an example, the calculation for Brazil is: ( )[ ] 64.11031.0028.01 17 =−−−+ .  Consequently, the 
real producer price of coffee is 164 per cent higher than would have been the case if real prices had 
continued to fall at a rate of 3.1 per cent per annum after liberalisation. 
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markets in all three countries. This increase means that liberalisation has improved the returns 
to production by reducing the net transfer costs throughout the coffee supply chain.  
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether producers are better off since liberalisation 
appears to be unambiguously yes.  Producers have benefited from a higher real price of 
coffee, higher coffee production, and a higher share of the terminal price of coffee. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper argues that to understand the dynamics of coffee prices we should model the 
effect that changes in government policies and market structure has had on the long-run 
producers’ share of the terminal price of coffee (i.e. the coffee price ratio, tu ). To simply 
undertake a cointegration analysis of coffee prices is inadequate because there have been 
large shifts in the coffee price ratio that coincide with policy and other market changes. 
For example, model 1 in Table 4 suggests that a long-run cointegrating relationship between 
the two coffee prices exists only for Brazil where long-run homogeneity is rejected and the 
speed of adjustment back to the long-run relationship is very slow.  If we assume that coffee 
prices are integrated then one must conclude the theoretical model is not a valid 
representation of how the producer and terminal prices of coffee are related in any of the 
three countries examined. 
Estimating the model allowing for the shifts in the coffee price ratio should improve the 
precision and reduce the bias of the estimates.  The preferred estimated model reported in 
Table 7 contains features that are consistent with our theoretical understanding of the coffee 
market.  First, terminal and producer prices move closely together in the long run.  Second, 
shocks to the relationship between the two coffee prices are eradicated very quickly.  Third, 
liberalisation of the coffee markets has coincided with large increases in the producer’s share 
of the terminal price of coffee.  In Brazil, the long-run share has risen from 0.6254 in the late 
1980s to 0.8461 in the most recent period up to October 2007.  Over the same period the 
long-run share to producers has increased from 0.6325 to 0.7896 for Guatemala and from 
0.5485 to 0.8494 for India. 
The systematic increase in the long-run producers’ share of terminal coffee prices over the 
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last seventeen years has greatly benefited the producers in these three coffee producing 
countries.  The combination of the increase in the long-run producers share and the increase 
in the real price of coffee after liberalisation suggest that the benefit to producers in 2007 is 
around 3.63, 0.31 and 0.43 $US billion.23  This can be compared with the actual payments to 
coffee producers of 4.63, 0.47 and 0.65 $US billion in 2007. 
Finally, there have been calls for a return to coffee market interventions on the grounds that 
the liberalisation of coffee markets has not improved the plight of producers.  For example, 
ActionAid (2008) and South Centre (2008) argue that the real producer price of coffee is 
lower in 2007 than it was thirty years ago and has not increased in line with the real retail 
price of coffee.24  Furthermore, Sarris (2002) argues that the increase in price variations due 
to liberalisation could mean that large and unexpected negative price shocks might result in 
some producers going out of business. This may well be the case and the international 
community and policy planners could do a lot more for producers.  However, this paper 
demonstrates that producers have benefited significantly since liberalisation and that 
returning to interventions of the kind that existed prior to liberalisation would not be in the 
interest of producers.  
                                                 
23  The total benefit to producers in 2007 is calculated as:  
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ •+•−•• eTeT Ux
P
QUPQ 1989
2007,
200720072007,2007 1
 where x  is the benefit in terms of a higher real 
terminal prices of coffee calculated as in footnote 22.  The first component of the calculation is what the 
producer actually received in 2007.  The second component is what the producer would receive if the real 
terminal price was lower, 
x
PT
+1
2007, , and they only received the 1989 equilibrium producers share, eU1989 .  
The difference between the two components is the benefit to producers from higher real coffee prices and a 
higher equilibrium share of terminal prices. This calculation assumes that the quantity of coffee produced is 
unaffected by the real price of coffee or the coffee price ratio. 
24  The fall in real prices over the past 30 years is consistent with our findings. However, as shown in Section 
5 producers have benefited from increases in real prices over the past 17 years during the liberalisation 
phase. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE DATA 
Variable Mnemonic Details 
Producer price of 
coffee P
P  is the cash (gate) price received for Arabica coffee by coffee producers. 
They are the dollar equivalents, that is, prices in local currency have 
been multiplied by the appropriate exchange rates to arrive at a monthly 
average producer price in US cents per pound. Although there may be 
many grades traded for Arabica coffee, most producing countries 
calculate a weighted average price of the major grades, major being 
determined on the basis of coffee traded in quantitative terms. The 
producer prices were obtained from the ICO database and the Coffee 
Boards of the respective countries. 
Terminal price of 
coffee T
P  is the ICO Indicator Price for Arabica coffee calculated by weighting the 
ex-dock prices on the international markets in New York, Bermen and 
Hamburg markets in US cents per pound. The prices are available on 
daily and monthly basis from the ICO database. 
Coffee price ratio U  is the producer price divided by the terminal price of coffee.  It is 
equivalent to the producers’ share of the terminal price of coffee. 
United States CPI  refers to the all urban consumer price index (old base) downloaded 25 
August 2008 from the United States Department of Labor.  
UN index of unit 
values of exports 
 refers to the United Nations index of unit values of exports of 
manufactured goods from developed market economies. It is used to 
convert values/unit values from current to constant terms. Downloaded 
on 25 August 2008 from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
Coffee production  is the annual data of total production of coffee by coffee exporting 
countries available from the ICO database. 
 
Note: Lower case variables in the paper are the natural logarithms of the upper case variables. 
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APPENDIX 2 IDENTIFYING BREAKS IN THE MEAN RATIO OF COFFEE PRICES 
The Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, 2003b) approach minimises the sum of the squared 
residuals to identify the dates of k  breaks in the natural logarithm of the ratio of the producer 
price of coffee to the terminal price of coffee and, thereby, identify 1+k  ‘coffee regimes’.  
The estimated model is: 
 tktu τγ += +1  (A2.1) 
where tu  is measured as tTtP pp ,, −  and tPp ,  and tTp ,  are the natural logarithms of the 
producer and terminal prices of coffee respectively for Brazil, Guatemala and India.  The 
terms 1+kγ  are a series of 1+k  constants that estimate the mean coffee price ratio in each of 
the 1+k  regimes and tτ  is a random error.  The minimum size between breaks is assumed to 
be 24 months and the final model is chosen using the Bayesian Information Criterion. 
The technique identifies 11, 8 and 10 breaks in the coffee price ratio for Brazil, Guatemala 
and India implying that there are 12, 9 and 11 coffee ‘regimes’ respectively in each country 
over the past 35 years.  The estimated dates of the coffee ‘regimes’ are reported in the table 
below. 
Table A2:  Estimated Dates of the Coffee ‘Regimes’ 
Brazil Guatemala India 
January 1973 to November 1974 January 1973 to May 1975 January 1973 to February 1976 
December 1974 to February 1977 June 1975 to November 1979 March 1976 to May 1978 
March 1977 to July 1979 December 1979 to August 1983 June 1978 to May 1980 
August 1979 to July 1981 October 1983 to April 1986 June 1980 to August 1982 
August 1981 to November 1984 May 1986 to April 1988 September 1982 to November 1986 
December 1984 to March 1987 May 1988 to March 1993 December 1986 to May 1989 
April 1987 to March 1989 April 1993 to March 1995 June 1989 to March 1992 
April 1989 to November 1991 April 1995 to January 1998 April 1992 to March 1984 
December 1991 to July 1996 February 1998 to October 2007 April 1994 to August 1996 
August 1996 to October 2000  September 1996 to October 2004 
November 2000 to November 2002  November 2004 to October 2007 
December 2002 to October 2007   
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Table 1:  Nominal and Real Coffee Prices 
Brazil 
 Nominal Values Real Value 
 Producer 
Price 
Terminal 
Price 
Transfer 
Costs 
Producer 
Price 
Terminal  
Price 
Transfer 
Costs 
1973 31.02 69.20 38.19 1 1 1 
1990 55.58 82.97 29.39 0.5832 0.4048 0.2599 
2007 98.23 111.66 13.44 0.9273 0.4725 0.1030 
Percentage Change 
1973 – 1990 72.7 (3.3) 19.9 (1.1) - 23.0 (- 1.5) - 41.7 (- 3.1) - 59.5 (- 5.2) - 74.0 (- 7.6) 
1990 – 2007 83.3 (3.6) 34.6 (1.8) - 54.3 (-4.5) 59.0 (2.8) 16.7 (0.9) - 60.7 (- 5.3) 
1973 – 2007 216.7 (3.4) 61.4 (1.4) - 64.8 (- 3.0) - 7.3 (- 0.2) - 52.8 (- 2.2) - 89.7 (- 6.5) 
Guatemala 
 Nominal Values Real Value 
 Producer 
Price 
Terminal 
Price 
Transfer 
Costs 
Producer 
Price 
Terminal  
Price 
Transfer 
Costs 
1973 46.03 62.30 16.27 1 1 1 
1990 54.58 89.46 34.87 0.4004 0.4848 0.7235 
2007 98.09 123.55 25.46 0.6240 0.5807 0.4581 
Percentage Change 
1973 – 1990 18.6 (1.0) 43.6 (2.2) 114.3 (4.6) - 60.0 (- 5.2) - 51.5 (- 4.2) - 27.6 (- 1.9) 
1990 – 2007 79.7 (3.5) 38.1 (1.9) - 27.0 (- 1.8) 55.9 (2.6) 19.8 (1.1) - 36.7 (- 2.7) 
1973 – 2007 113.1 (2.3) 98.3 (2.0) 56.5 (1.3) - 37.6 (- 1.4) - 41.9 (- 1.6) - 54.2 (- 2.3) 
India 
 Nominal Values Real Value 
 Producer 
Price 
Terminal 
Price 
Transfer 
Costs 
Producer 
Price 
Terminal  
Price 
Transfer 
Costs 
1973 45.37 62.30 16.93 1 1 1 
1990 66.75 89.46 22.70 0.4968 0.4848 0.4527 
2007 108.34 123.55 15.21 0.6992 0.5807 0.2630 
Percentage Change 
1973 – 1990 47.1 (2.3) 43.6 (2.2) 34.1 (1.7) - 50.3 (- 4.0) - 51.5 (- 4.2) - 54.7 (- 4.6) 
1990 – 2007 62.3 (2.9) 38.1 (1.9) - 33.0 (- 2.3) 40.8 (2.0) 19.8 (1.1) - 41.9 (- 3.1) 
1973 – 2007 138.8 (2.6) 98.3 (2.0) - 10.2 (- 0.3) - 30.1 (- 1.0) - 41.9 (- 1.6) - 73.7 (- 3.9) 
 
 
 Unit Values  
of Exports 
US CPI 
Percentage Change 
1973 – 1990 196.2 (6.6) 194.1 (6.6) 
1990 – 2007 15.3 (0.8) 58.7 (2.8) 
Notes:  Figures in brackets are the compounded annualised 
percentage change. Real values are calculated with 
reference to the UN index of unit values of exports.  
Annual values are averages of the monthly values.  
Nominal values are in US cents per pound.  Transfer costs 
are the difference between the terminal and producer price.  
The table on the right shows the percentage changes in the 
UN index of unit values of exports and the United States 
CPI. 
1973 – 2007 241.5 (3.7) 366.6 (4.6) 
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Table 2:  Testing for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors 
 Brazil Guatemala India 
H0: r = Trace CV5% p-value Trace CV5% p-value Trace CV5% p-value 
Model 1 – Constant in the Cointegrating Space 
0 15.8840 15.4082 0.0421 43.7836 15.4082 0.0000 39.2301 15.4082 0.0000 
1 3.4289 3.8415 0.0641 7.9300 3.8415 0.0049 6.6017 3.8415 0.0102 
Model 2 – Constant and Trend in the Cointegrating Space 
0 23.8590 25.7310 0.0862 48.4878 25.7310 0.0000 44.6153 25.7310 0.0000 
1 8.3049 12.4478 0.2345 8.5179 12.4478 0.2183 6.8484 12.4478 0.3709 
Model 3 – Constant, Trend and Shift Dummies in the Cointegrating Space 
0 95.5834 81.1311 0.0026 157.1244 66.3054 0.0000 158.9223 76.1898 0.0000 
1 26.5669 43.2295 0.6642 43.9173 34.8278 0.0032 31.5731 40.3406 0.2841 
Model 4 – Constant and Shift Dummies in the Cointegrating Space 
0 94.8161 55.1580 0.0000 149.7019 42.5595 0.0000 139.3038 50.5940 0.0000 
1 26.3182 19.6200 0.0060 40.3706 15.0355 0.0000 17.9809 18.1718 0.0556 
 
Notes: The maximum number of cointegration vectors is given by r.  Trace and the p-value are the Bartlett small sample 
adjusted values of the Trace test statistics and associated probability value respectively.  CV5% is the 5 per cent critical 
value of the Trace test.  In Models 3 and 4, the inclusion of the shift dummies in the cointegration space affect the 
distribution of the test statistics in such a way as to reject cointegration too often i.e. the dummies increase the value of 
the Trace statistic relative to the critical value.  In these models the simulated Trace statistic critical values are reported 
based on the actual finite sample behaviour of the data. 
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Table 3:  ADF Univariate Unit Root Tests 
Series Original Data De-meaned Data 
Brazil Test Statistic Probability Value Test Statistic Probability Value 
Producer Price - 3.48 0.0089 - 4.33 0.0005 
Terminal Price - 2.91 0.0454 - 4.02 0.0014 
Ratio of Coffee Prices - 3.33* # 0.0634 - 7.57# 0.0000 
Guatemala     
Producer Price - 3.01 0.0350 - 4.33 0.0005 
Terminal Price - 2.91 0.0454 - 4.02 0.0014 
Ratio of Coffee Prices - 6.10* 0.0000 - 11.61 0.0000 
India     
Producer Price - 3.00 0.0361 - 3.84# 0.0027 
Terminal Price - 2.91 0.0454 - 4.62 0.0001 
Ratio of Coffee Prices - 5.71* 0.0000 - 10.00 0.0000 
 
Notes:  Reported are the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test statistics and the associated probability 
values.  The data are in natural logarithms.  De-meaned data is the original data adjusted for the shifts in 
mean as identified by the Bai-Perron technique for each country (see Appendix 2).  * indicates a significant 
trend in the unit root test.  In all other cases the trend is insignificant and excluded prior to inference.  A lag 
length of one was chosen on the basis of SIC in all cases except when zero as indicated by #.  The ratio of 
coffee prices is the natural logarithm of the producer price divided by the terminal price of coffee. 
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Table 4:  VAR Error Correction Model of Coffee Prices 
Model 1 – A constant in the long run 
BRAZIL 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.1312 
(- 0.5) 
- 0.0459 
(- 3.5) 
- 0.0200 
(-2.0) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0176 
(-1.2) 
0.0062 
(0.5) 
 
TLRR = 0.0246, LM1 = 0.2353, LM2 = 0.4244.  Normality = 0.0000.  Stationarity:  Pp = 0.7397, Tp = 
0.0171.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0171, Tp = 0.7397.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0035, Tp = 0.0971. 
GUATEMALA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.9223 
(- 12.5) 
- 0.1879 
(- 5.8) 
0.0142 
(0.7) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.1729 
(- 5.6) 
0.0226 
(1.1) 
 
TLRR = 0.4177, LM1 = 0.1003, LM2 = 0.0516.  Normality = 0.0000.  Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 
0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.5489. 
INDIA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.7494 
(- 10.5) 
- 0.0853 
(- 3.9) 
0.0732 
(3.2) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0442 
(- 2.6) 
0.0673 
(3.9) 
 
TLRR = 0.0307, LM1 = 0.3361, LM2 = 0.5244.  Normality = 0.0000.  Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 
0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0006, Tp = 0.0040. 
 
Notes:  Reported as ( ) are t-statistics.  The models and statistics are estimated with two lags of the core 
variables and an effective sample of 416 monthly observations for the period January 1973 to October 
2007.  The number of lags was chosen by a likelihood ratio test for lag reduction. TLRR is the finite sample 
Bartlett corrected probability values of the test of the long-run cointegrating restriction that 1=β .  LM1 
and LM2 are the probability values of the Lagrange Multiplier tests of no serial correlation in the errors of 
lags 1 and 2 respectively.  Normality is the probability value of the Doornik-Hansen test for normal errors.  
Stationarity, Exclusion and Exogeneity are the probability values of the likelihood ratio tests that Pp  and 
Tp  (and trend if applicable) are stationary, can be excluded from the cointegrating space and/or weakly 
exogenous respectively.  Models estimated using CATS 2.0. 
 28
Table 5:  VAR Error Correction Model of Coffee Prices 
Model 2 – A constant and trend in the long run 
BRAZIL 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  Trend PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.7010 
(- 4.7) 
- 0.1828 
(- 3.1) 
- 0.0630 
(- 3.0) 
- 0.0044 
(- 0.3) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0048 
(- 4.3) 
- 0.0351 
(-1.6) 
0.0199 
(1.2) 
 
TLRR = 0.2875, TT = 0.1513, LM1 = 0.2688, LM2 = 0.4058.  Normality = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 
0.0883, Tp = 0.0121.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0121, Tp = 0.0883, Trend = 0.0830.  Exogeneity:  
Pp = 0.0494, Tp = 0.8594. 
GUATEMALA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  Trend PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.9571 
(- 13.9) 
- 0.0495  
(-2.2) 
- 0.2022 
(- 6.0) 
0.0218 
(1.0) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0528 
(- 2.3) 
- 0.1935 
(- 5.9) 
0.0268 
(1.3) 
 
TLRR = 0.0246, TT = 0.0564, LM1 = 0. 1204, LM2 = 0. 0683.  Normality = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 
0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000, Trend = 0.0381.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, 
Tp = 0.3724. 
 
INDIA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  Trend PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.7783 
(- 12.0) 
- 0.0514 
(- 2.4) 
- 0.0913 
(- 4.0) 
0.0864 
(3.7) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.3474 
(- 2.4) 
- 0.0508 
(- 2.8) 
0.0788 
(4.3) 
 
TLRR = 0.0316, TT = 0.0364, LM1 = 0.3603, LM2 = 0.5283.  Normality  = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 
0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000, Trend = 0.0226.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0003, 
Tp = 0.0009. 
 
 
Notes:  The trend is multiplied by 100.  TT is the finite sample Bartlett corrected probability value of the 
likelihood ratio exclusion test of the estimated trend.  For further details see the notes to Table 4. 
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Table 6:  VAR Error Correction Model of Coffee Prices 
Model 3 – A constant, trend and shift dummies in the long run 
BRAZIL 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  
Trend 
PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.8907 
(- 15.9) 
- 0.0975 
(- 0.7) 
- 0.2675 
(- 6.8) 
- 0.0360 
(-1.1) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0225 
(-0.2) 
- 0.2416 
(- 5.9) 
- 0.0029 
(- 0.1) 
 
TLRR = 0.1711, TT = 0.3457, LM1 = 0.4823, LM2 = 0.0597.  Normality = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 
0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000, Trend = 0.4679.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.3682. 
Dec’ 
1974 
- 0.2390 
(- 2.6) 
Aug’ 
1979 
0.2867 
(3.2) 
Dec’ 
1984 
- 0.5627
(- 6.5) 
April 
1989 
- 0.4988
(- 5.6) 
Aug’ 
1996 
- 0.0526 
(- 0.6) 
Dec’ 
2002 
- 0.1916
(-2.1) 
March 
1977 
0.3996 
(4.5) 
Aug’ 
1981 
- 0.1152 
(- 1.3) 
April 
1987 
0.4902
(5.4) 
Dec’ 
1991 
- 0.2442
(- 2.8) 
Nov’ 
2000 
0.2050 
(2.3) 
  
GUATEMALA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  
Trend 
PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.9040 
(- 24.0) 
- 0.1006 
(- 2.0) 
- 0.4731 
(- 10.6) 
- 0.0423 
(- 1.3) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0845 
(- 1.6) 
- 0.4231 
(- 9.7)) 
0.0779 
(2.6) 
 
TLRR = 0.0710, TT = 0.0893, LM1 = 0.0022, LM2 = 0.0001.  Normality = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, 
Tp = 0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000, Trend = 0.0575.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.2800. 
June 
1975 
0.3238 
(5.6) 
Oct’ 
1983 
- 0.3012 
(- 5.3) 
May 
1988 
0.0956 
(1.6) 
April 
1995 
- 0.0766 
(- 2.8) 
Dec’ 
1979 
- 0.1104 
(- 2.1) 
May 
1986 
0.3367 
(5.2) 
April 
1993 
0.1333 
(2.2) 
Feb’ 
1998 
- 0.1693 
(-2.8) 
INDIA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  
Trend 
PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 1.0114 
(- 24.7) 
0.0809 
(1.4) 
- 0.1957 
(- 5.6) 
0.2834 
(8.3) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 0.0890 
(1.8) 
- 0.2010 
(- 5.7) 
0.2831 
(8.2) 
 
TLRR = 0.8445, TT = 0.2760, LM1 = 0.1797, LM2 = 0.3259.  Normality  = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, 
Tp = 0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000, Trend = 0.2149.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000. 
Mar’ 
1976 
0.4984 
(10.9) 
June 
1980 
- 0.1761 
(- 3.6) 
Dec’ 
1986 
- 0.2298
(- 5.3) 
April 
1992 
- 0.1405 
(- 3.0) 
Sept’ 
1996 
- 0.3108
(- 6.5) 
June 
1978 
- 0.2232 
(- 4.5) 
Sept’ 
1982 
0.2035 
(4.6) 
June 
1989 
- 0.2091
(- 4.6) 
April 
1994 
0.4221 
(8.7) 
Nov’ 
2004 
- 0.2604
(- 5.5) 
 
Notes:  Lower panels for each country are the estimated shift dummies in the restricted models. For further 
details see the notes to Table 4 and Table 5. 
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Table 7:  VAR Error Correction Model of Coffee Prices 
Model 4 – A constant and shift dummies in the long run 
BRAZIL 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.9058 
(- 17.2) 
- 0.2652 
(- 6.7) 
- 0.0338 
(-1.1) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.2420 
(-5.9) 
- 0.0036 
(- 0.1) 
 
TLRR = 0.2085, LM1 = 0.5148, LM2 = 0.0577.  Normality = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exclusion: 
Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.3981. 
Dec’ 
1974 
- 0.2449 
(- 2.8) 
Aug’ 
1979 
0.2806 
(3.3) 
Dec’ 
1984 
- 0.5702
(- 7.6) 
April 
1989 
- 0.5049
(- 6.1) 
Aug’ 
1996 
- 0.0645 
(- 1.1) 
Dec’ 
2002 
- 0.2014
(-2.8) 
March 
1977 
0.3939 
(4.8) 
Aug’ 
1981 
- 0.1225 
(- 1.5) 
April 
1987 
0.4842 
(5.7) 
Dec’ 
1991 
- 0.2544
(- 3.8) 
Nov’ 
2000 
0.1965 
(2.6) 
  
GUATEMALA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 0.9189 
(- 23.8) 
- 0.4547 
(- 10.2) 
- 0.0578 
(- 1.9) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.4117 
(- 9.4) 
0.0852 
(2.9) 
 
TLRR = 0.1309, LM1 = 0.0001, LM2 = 0.6317.  Normality = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  
Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.1319. 
June 
1975 
0.2924 
(5.4) 
Oct’ 
1983 
- 0.3316 
(- 6.1) 
May 
1988 
0.0607 
(1.1) 
April 
1995 
- 0.1062 
(- 1.7) 
Dec’ 
1979 
- 0.1562 
(- 3.3) 
May 
1986 
0.3101 
(4.8) 
April 
1993 
0.1043 
(1.8) 
Feb’ 
1998 
- 0.1693 
(-2.8) 
INDIA 
 Long-run Coefficients Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Pp  Tp  PpΔ  TpΔ  
Unrestricted 1.0000 - 1.0391  
(- 24.1) 
- 0.1699 
(- 5.8) 
0.2250 
(7.8) 
Restricted 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.1813 
(- 6.0) 
0.2243 
(7.5) 
 
TLRR = 0.4704, LM1 = 0.0083, LM2 = 0.0777.  Normality  = 0.0000. Normality  = 0.0000. Stationarity:  Pp = 0.0000, 
Tp = 0.0000.  Exclusion: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000.  Exogeneity: Pp = 0.0000, Tp = 0.0000. 
Mar’ 
1976 
0.5463 
(10.5) 
June 
1980 
- 
0.1491 
(- 2.6) 
Dec’ 
1986 
- 0.2019
(- 4.3) 
April 
1992 
- 0.1102 
(- 2.0) 
Sept’ 
1996 
- 0.2669
(- 6.2) 
June 
1978 
- 0.2231 
(- 3.9) 
Sept’ 
1982 
0.2442 
(5.0) 
June 
1989 
- 0.1842
(- 3.6) 
April 
1994 
0.4594 
(8.1) 
Nov’ 
2004 
- 0.2021
(- 5.1) 
Notes:  Lower panel for each country is the estimated cointegration shift dummies in the restricted model.  For 
further details see the notes to Table 4, 5 and 6. 
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Graph 1:  Terminal and Producer Prices for Arabica Coffee  
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Note:  Thin and thick lines are the terminal and producer prices of coffee respectively. 
 32
Graph 2:  Ratio of the Producer Price to the Terminal Price of Coffee 
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Note:  Thick line is the ratio of the producer to the terminal price of coffee.  The horizontal thin lines are the 
mean coffee price ratio as estimated by the Bai-Perron technique. 
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Graph 3:  Value of Coffee Production 
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Note:  The black, grey and dashed lines are the actual value of production to producers, the value of production 
according to the ‘efficient’ market outcome, and the value of production at terminal prices respectively. 
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Graph 4:  Nominal and Real Losses of Coffee Producers 
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Note:  The thin and thick lines are the nominal and real values of the loss to producers.  Real values are in terms 
of the UN index of unit values of exports. 
